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1 Question 1.
1. Derive the Tobin’s q, and draw the phase diagram.
2. Define q and enumerate three interpretations of such a variable. Which of these is the
Tobin’s q?
3. Discuss the empirical evidence.
4. Discuss the consequences of including financial-market imperfections to the model (Op-
tional — analytical passages).
2 Question 2.
Corporations in the Us are allowed to subtract depreciation allowances from their taxable income.
The depreciation allowances are based on the purchase price of the capital: a corporation that
buys a new capital good at time t can deduct fraction D(s) of the purchase price from its taxable
income at time t + s. Depreciation allowances often take the for of straight-line depreciation:
D(s) = 1/T for s ∈ [0, T ], and D(s) = 0 for s > T , where T is the tax life of the capital good.
1. Assume straight-line depreciation. If the marginal corporate income tax rate is constant
at τ and the interest rate is constant at i, by how much does purchasing a unit of capital
at price of PK reduce the present value of the firm’s corporate tax liabilities as a function
of T , τ , i and PK? Thus, what is the after-tax price of the capital good to the firm?
2. Suppose that i = r+ pi and that pi increases with no change in r. How does this affect the
after-tax price of the capital good to the firm?
3 Question 3.
Consider the model of investment in Question 1. Describe the effects of each of the following
changes, assuming that K, q are initially at their long-run equilibrium value.
1. A war destroys half of the capital stock (unanticipated, permanent);
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2. The government taxes returns from owning firms at rate τ (so that a firm’s profit per unit
of capital for a given K is (1−τ)pi(K(t)) rather than pi(K(t))) (unanticipated, permanent);
3. The government taxes investment. Specifically, firms pay the government γ for each unit of
capital they acquire, and receive a subsidy of γ for each unit of disinvestment (anticipated,
permanent);
4. The government will impose a one-time capital levy. Specifically, capital holders will be
taxed an amount equal to fraction f of the value of their capital holdings at some time t1
(anticipated, temporary).
4 Question 4.
Let H denote the stock of housing, I the rate of investment, pH the real price of housing, and
R the rent. Assume that I is increasing in pH , so that I = I(pH), with I ′(·) > 0, and that
H˙ = I − δH. Assume also that the rent is a decreasing function of H: R = R(H), R′(·) < 0.
Finally, assume also that the rental income plus capital gains must equal the exogenous required
rate of return, r: (R+ p˙H)/pH = r.
1. Sketch the set of points in (H, pH) space such that H˙ = 0, and the set of points such that
p˙H = 0;
2. What are the dynamics of H, pH in each region of the resulting diagram? Sketch the saddle
path;
3. Suppose the market is initially in long-run equilibrium, and that there is an unexpected
permanent increase in r. What happens to H and pH?
4. Suppose the market is initially in long-run equilibrium, and that it becomes known that
there will be a permanent increase in r at some time t1. What happens to H and pH?
5. Are adjustment costs internal or external in this model?
6. Why is the H˙ = 0 locus not horizontal in this model?
5 Question 5 (Optional).
Consider a firm that is contemplating undertaking an investment with a cost of I. There are two
periods. The investment will pay off pi1 in period 1 and pi2 in period 2. pi1 is certain, but pi2 is
uncertain. The firm maximises expected profits. Assume the interest rate is zero.
1. Suppose the firm’s only choices are to undertake the investment in period 1 or not to
undertake it at all. Under what condition will the firm undertake the investment?
2. Suppose the firm also has the possibility of undertaking the investment in period 2, after
the value of pi2 is known; in this case the investment pays off only pi2. Is it possible for the
condition in (a) to be satisfied but for the firm’s expected profits to be higher if it does not
invest in period 1 than if it does invest?
3. Define the cost of waiting as pi1, and define the benefit of waiting as Pr(pi2 < I)E[I−pi2|pi2 <
I]. Explain why these represent the cost and the benefit of waiting. Show that the difference
in the firm’s expected profits between not investing in period 1 and investing in period 1
equals the benefit of waiting minus the cost.
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